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Abstract 
 
Belize got its Independence when the region was going through an economic crisis 
with debt burden and traditional export prices reduction. The northern region, once 
the most important economically, faced major challenges which prompted the 
introduction of fiscal incentive programs to alleviate the growing unemployment 
and decreasing economic activity. As an international border, it also faced, during 
the eighties and nineties, the effects of the Mexican peso devaluation. However, 
Mexico also constituted its mayor market for the establishment of the Commercial 
Free Zone. The northern region economy has only partially recovered from the 
major structural changes that Belize has gone through in its post independence 
period. 
 
 
 
In 1981 when Belize attained its independence, other countries in the region were 
also celebrating anniversaries: Mexico its 171st anniversary, Jamaica its 19th, 
Guatemala its 160th and Honduras its 159th. Independence in the voice of then-
Prime Minister George Price was the attainment of political and economic freedom. 
Although this political move was met by skepticism by some, many were betting on 
better times to come, higher standards of living, and improved political 
participation. 
 
On that 21st day of September the Belizean people faced a challenging future, 
since the neighbouring Central and South American regions were at the verge of 
falling into debt crises. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua were in the midst of 
civil wars--battling with guerrillas and civil revolutions, and at the same time 
international trade was restructuring with respect to traditional exports, which 
affected the whole region. 
 
The economic performance of Belize was, and continues to be, connected to its 
relations with the United States, the Caribbean, and to a lesser extent to its Latin 
American neighbours, with the exception of Mexico, which has played an important 
role in Belize’s development. This brief description of Belize’s post independence 
performance highlights Belize’s economic relations with Mexico, in particular that of 
the border region that they share. 
Belize enjoys warm relations with its neighbour to the north. As early as 1958, 
Mexico stated its desire for a resolution of Belize's territorial problem with 
Guatemala and supported initiatives that respected the freedom and independence 
of the Belizean people. Mexico also provided critical support in favour of Belizean 
independence and territorial integrity in 1977. Although Mexico claimed parts of 
Belize during the nineteenth century, it signed treaties with both Britain and 
Guatemala in the course of that century to set the border definitively between 
Mexico and Belize. One such treaty, and probably the most important, is the 
Spenser St. John – Mariscal signed on the 8th of July 1893 and its amendment on 
the 26th July 1897 celebrated between Mexico and Britain. Part of this amendment 
included an agreement  to guarantee Mexico, in perpetuity, transit rights through 
Belizean waters (Http://www.sre.gob.mx/cilasur/Assets/Images/ActasBelice/tratadomexbel1893.pdf). 
Quintana Roo is the most southeastern state in Mexico and borders Belize. Its 
capital city is Chetumal. Quintana Roo and other Mexican states in the region1, 
Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras all share a common heritage initiated and 
perpetuated by the great Maya civilization. The Maya people, their heritage, 
culture, and language today serve as tourist attractions in a broad project carried 
on by the Mundo Maya Organization (http://www.mundomayaorganizacion.org/). 
Economic relations between Belize and Mexico can be analysed at least on two 
levels: national and local. At the national level we share the benefits of international 
trade and socioeconomic agreements with respect to motor vehicle transit, 
education, culture, the fight against drug trafficking and dependency, preservation 
of archaeological sites, preservation of natural resources, among others 
(www.sre.gob.mx). At the local level there are cultural and economic relations 
between the inhabitants of the border region. The published accounts of these 
relationships are many (Iniciativa 1992a,1992b, CIQRO, 1994, Caribe 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c); however, our interest is in how these relationships have evolved 
since the independence of Belize in 1981. 
The major events affecting the border region during this period are (1) the 
devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1982, (2) the closure of the sugar factory at 
Libertad, Corozal District in 1985, (3) the entry of Mexico in the World Trade 
Organization in 1984, (4) the signing of the North American Trade Agreement in 
1994, and (5) the opening of the Commercial Free Zone at Santa Elena, Corozal 
District, also in 1994. These events have influenced the relations between Belize 
and Mexico, both at the national and local level, in particular the latter. 
Devaluation of the Mexican Peso 
Northern Belize and southeastern Mexico share a common Maya culture. The early 
inhabitants of northern Belize came from Mexico, bringing with them the Spanish 
and Maya language, traditions, and other elements of culture, and the cultivation of 
sugar cane. Cultural2 and later economic ties with Mexico have therefore been 
present from years back.  Mexico, unlike Guatemala, gave its support to Belize in 
the negotiations for independence. Mexico voted in favour of the United Nation’s 
                                                 
1 Yucatán, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, and Chiapas.  
2 Historical accounts of cultural and economic ties between inhabitants of Mexico and Belize can be read in 
Nigel Boland, Grant Jones, Paul Sullivan. 
General Assembly resolution that called for the necessary steps to be taken to lead 
Belize to independence with territorial integrity (Belize Times, 22 March 1981).  
 
However, during the early 1980s Mexico was going through economic problems 
that led to continued devaluation of the Mexican peso as shown in the table below. 
 
 
Year Pesos per $US (average) Percentage of devaluation 
1976-82 70.00 240 % 
1982-88 2,285.00 3,164 % 
1988-94 3,450.00 (N$ 3.45) 51 % 
1994-00 9.45 174 % 
2000- 11.63 23.07 % 
Source: Banco de México 
Devaluations have an effect on the balance of trade by making imports expensive 
and exports more attractive. This translated to weakening of Mexico’s purchasing 
power of foreign goods. Both at the national and in particular at the local level, this 
event caused significant economic changes in Belize and Mexico. 
In 1972 the city of Chetumal was designated a free zone area. Being the only such 
territory in southeastern Mexico, its fame as a commercial centre was well known 
in the region. Manufactured items from Panama were imported through the deep 
water port in Belize. Reciprocally, Belizeans have used Mexican highways to travel 
from the USA bringing along goods and used vehicles for sale in Belize. As a Free 
Commercial Territory, Chetumal flourished with the sale of imported merchandise 
such as electrical equipments, canned food, and clothing. 
 
Informal Trade 
 
During the 1970s Northern Belize, especially Corozal, also experienced an 
economic boom with Mexicans coming to buy from the Hindu, Chinese, and 
Belizean merchants. Among their favorite imported products were Dutch cheese, 
creamery butter, textiles, and many Chinese and Hindu products, a luxury for most 
Mexicans. Mexicans came in their private vehicles and by buses. This important 
injection of Mexican pesos in the northern Belizean economy helped to keep the 
Hindu, Chinese, and local businesses vibrant, particularly in Corozal. However the 
devaluation of the peso in 1982 reversed this benefit. Now with more pesos to the 
Belizean dollar, the monetary flow of Belizean dollars went north to the businesses 
in Chetumal, Mexico. 
 
The devaluation of the peso marked the beginning of the small scale transborder 
trade conducted by Belizeans households and merchants, particularly from the 
Corozal and Orange Walk districts, of basic items purchased in Chetumal. This 
leakage was increased by the demand by Belizeans for medical and other services 
in southeast Mexico. Consequently, commercial activity in Corozal declined 
resulting in the flight of many foreign businessmen to other parts of Belize and to 
México causing the town of Corozal to face a depression. Other businesses as 
cinemas, discotheques, and restaurants among others eventually shut their doors, 
since most of the income available was being spent in the state of Quintana Roo’s 
capital, Chetumal. 
 
In an article in Amandala (January 27th, 1995), I stated that the 1982 devaluation 
had a tremendous impact on the northern economy. The peso fell from 12 to 20, 
and then to 50 and eventually reached 70 to the Belize dollar. Belizeans flooded 
the Mexican supermarkets in search of basic food items, and conducted business 
with gas stations, health centers, hotels, and restaurants. These transactions 
created an informal trade estimated to have reached an amount of $6,965.23 
million Belize dollars per annum (Ken, 1995). Between 1981 and 1991 estimated 
arrivals per day in Chetumal were 500 Belizeans. This represented a significant 
leakage for the Mexican economy. Belizean customers caused a financial boom for 
the city of Chetumal. 
 
The flow of Belizean dollars to southern Mexico increased with subsequent 
devaluations of the Mexican peso. From 1988 to 1994, this situation worsened. 
However, the effect of this trade in Mexico was the transfer of subsidy to Belizean 
consumers since most of the trade was concentrated in basic food items bought at 
the government-subsidized supermarkets, such as CONASUPO, SEDENA, and  
ISSTE (Pech Febles and Cruz Cáceres, 2000). 
 
It is important to note that while the transfer of income over the border meant a loss 
to the Belizean economy, it helped the Belizean households of the northern region 
to stretch their dollars. The sugar industry was in a crisis, the business community 
was suffering, and the possibility of getting more for the few dollars circulating in 
Belize was there. The situation of the Mexican economy and its impact on northern 
Belize indicated a lack of interest by the national government: research was not 
conducted, the economic impact was not measured, and no contingency plan or 
solution was proposed. The economic crises experienced by the northern region 
illustrated the centralization of  economic3 and political issues, since this outdistrict 
concerns was not given enough importance in the house of representatives and by 
the cabinet4.  Prices of Mexican imported food items in Belize were many times 
higher compared to prices in the easily accessible Mexican bordering town of 
                                                 
3 Economic issues such as commercial and price structures in Belize have not been studies sufficiently, but 
the existence of few companies in this activity can indicate the existence of  duopolies. 
4 This is a reflection on the political structure of Belize. Research need to be done to give evidenced accounts 
of centralization. The move for political reform carried out by government through the Society for the 
Promotion of Education, Advocacy and Research together with Civil Societies during the 90s constitutes the 
initial platform towards the decentralization process.  
Chetumal. This stimulated contraband and households numerous border crossing 
to acquire basic food items (CIQRO, 1994b). This behavior of the Belizean 
population at the Mexican border gave an insight of the commerce structure that 
maintains higher prices on imported food items.  
 
Formal Trade 
 
Formal trade between Mexico and Belize are of two types: the normal imports and 
exports of good and Belize’s reexports to Mexico.  
 
 
 
Belize Imports from & Exports to Mexico
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Imports of Mexican products to Belize have steadily risen, while exports remained  
stable, with the exception of a sudden rise in 1999.  
 
As a reexporter, Belize imports goods and then resells them in neighbouring 
countries, primarily Mexico, or merely transports them, collecting fees for port and 
road facilities. The arrangement is attractive because of Belize's relatively low 
shipping costs. However, Mexico's economic payment crisis of 1982, which 
reduced Mexican imports, put a dent in Belize's foreign exchange earnings as well. 
Reexports had amounted to 37% of export earnings in 1981, but fell to 16% in 
1983, contributing to a 35% drop in total export earnings during that period.  
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Reexports show a decline, particularly in 1993, 1996, 2001, and 2004. Most of 
these reexports are related to the economic performance of Mexico. However, the 
recovery in 1997 and 2002 as a whole may have been in response to the activity at 
the Commercial Free Zone at the Belize - Mexico border. 
 
Restructuring of the sugar industry 
To add to the economic crises already being suffered in the north during the early 
years of independence due to the devaluation of the Mexican peso, the sugar 
industry, Belize’s number one foreign exchange earner, was also in crisis. The 
history of sugar cane in Belize starts in 1964 when the small mill at Libertad was 
established by Tate and Lyle, a large British sugar conglomerate. This event 
accompanied the beginning of nearly twenty years of great profit.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, Belize's economy grew rapidly, thanks to the 
extraordinary success of the sugar production. During the 1970s, sugar accounted 
for almost 70% of all export revenues. As a result of this high level of dependency, 
the Belizean economy, although prosperous, entered the 1980s insufficiently 
diversified and highly susceptible to external shocks. In the late 1980s, farmers of 
Corozal started to diversify into the production of papaya, soya beans and other 
agricultural products. 
In 1980 the average world price of raw sugar was US$0.13 per kilogram. By 1984, 
that price had fallen to US$0.02. As sugar prices collapsed, Belize's terms of trade 
deteriorated, and from 1980 to 1985 GDP grew an average of only 1.2% per year. 
The crisis was compounded in 1982 when, for the first time since 1974, the United 
States government implemented a sugar quota system. The result was a reduction 
in total sugar exports from about 5 million tons in 1980-81 to about 1 million tons by 
1987.  
Sugar Export
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During 1984 it became clear that the combined effects of reduced US quota, low 
world prices, and unfavourable currency exchange rate resulted in financial losses 
for the Belize Sugar Industry (BSI) and would shortly lead the company into 
bankruptcy unless drastic action was taken. By mid 1985, the financial crises 
forced the restructuring of BSI which, unfortunately, had to include the closure of 
the Corozal Factory after the completion of crop in that year (BSI, 25th Anniversary 
Publication,1989). 
Preferential trade agreements provide a reminder that trade liberalization is a 
double-edged sword for all trade participants, developed and developing alike. For 
example, in the early 1990s the existing quota systems for the Belizean sugar 
industry provided distinct advantages. Quotas guaranteed that Belizean sugar 
would have access to markets in the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the United States at prices far above world market levels. At the same time, it was 
also clear that a quota system was a unilateral act that limited market access and 
that it could be changed or eliminated by foreign powers at their will.  
The sugar crises in the early years of independence created a production problem 
in the northern district of Corozal. As noted by Perry, Woods, and Steagall (1993) 
Sugar industry leaders reacted rationally, trying to shift output to 
alternative markets as cultivation shrunk. Great Britain was able to 
absorb much of the excess supply, under the LOME Agreement, 
passing it through to world markets … Cane farmers in northern 
Belize also reacted rationally. Many of them shifted to the illegal 
cultivation of marijuana, adding to the problem of drug regulation 
facing the national government. (49) 
By December of 1986 the closure of the Libertad sugar factory had displaced 
hundreds of employees and affected the livelihood of cane farmers and their 
families. According to the BSI officials, the 41% reduction of the sugar quota from 
16,200 to 8,500 long tons by the US Congress meant an $8 million loss in foreign 
exchange to the economy of Belize. 
 
The sugar industry situation was the result of the world’s trading conditions of that 
commodity as mentioned above. Similar experiences had occurred in many other 
regions; for example the Heineken manufacturing in Yucatan caused an economic 
crisis among the cultivators, the industry, and the government, which eventually led 
to the restructuring of the region’s economy. It is important to state that the 
effective restructuring of the economy of a region depends largely on the 
government’s insight and foresight of the industry and its communication with the 
stake holders and the population at large. However, for political reasons, the 
situation of the sugar industry was kept from the people; the government insisted 
on promising the increase in quotas by the industry, which led not only to 
increasing the existing quotas among the existing cane farmers but, to worsen the 
situation some more, giving quotas to new farmers based on  political clientelism. 
After the closure of the Libertad factory, promises were made to reopen it in 
addition to establish a new factory under an agreements with the Mexican sugar 
industry in the region. But indeed the sugar industry was and is a declining industry  
worldwide. 
 
In 1988 a new industry, Petrojam, opened at the Libertad factory to produce 
molasses.   
As part of its first moves to address the situation, government 
increased the sugar quota–that is the amount of sugar cane both 
the Belize Sugar Industries (BSI) and Petrojam can grind each 
year… This increase has benefited cane farmers in the northern 
districts, especially Corozal. (GOB, Oct. 11, 1990) 
Government is also exploring the possibilities of a joint venture 
between the Obregón Sugar Factory in Chetumal, Quintana Roo 
and Petrojam to produce sugar. Earlier this year, government 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Belize Bio-chemical 
Limited for the establishment of a sugar cane factory on 50 acres of 
land between Concepción and Libertad Villages … to produce 
sugar and ethanol. (GOB, Oct. 11, 1990) 
 
Petrojam opened, but only for a few years. The other projects mentioned by 
government were not successful. By November of 1989 the shortage of jobs was 
also causing frustration, especially among the young population. Then the news 
broke.  
We (the government) are looking into the possibility of establishing 
a pilot commercial free–trade zone in Santa Elena. Studies are 
presently being undertaken and we hope to get this project started 
as soon as possible. This would undoubtedly create jobs for more 
customs officers, clerks, managers, carpenters, plumbers, 
electrician and masons. Recently, a concession to open a bicycle 
factory has been signed by the Minister of Economic Development 
in Corozal. (El  Corozaleño, 6th November 1989) 
Because of the uncertain future of these traditional exports, efforts were made 
towards agricultural diversification, and a special focus was made on tourism and 
industry. Industrial development was encouraged through a number of incentives, 
which included the awarding by government of tax holidays and import duty 
exemption on inputs of up to a maximum of 25 years to qualifying companies. 
 
Tourism 
With the decline of the sugar industry in Corozal, tourism started to become 
important as an alternative economic activity to generate the necessary income for 
the region. But unfortunately, with both Corozal and Chetumal’s slow growth, it 
would take a couple of years for it to surge. To market tourism it is necessary to 
know your attractiveness and your market potentials. The type of bay and services 
available at the time in Corozal were underqualified for the type of tourist that 
visited the area. Much needed to be done to turn this into an income generating 
activity. However, proximity to San Pedro, Belize and Cancun, Mexico, meant that 
a potential market existed and efforts to link up with these two tourist sites would 
be a sound investment. 
 
Thus in the early 1990s some projects were announced; one was the Consejo Bay 
Project to develop a multi-million dollar tourist resort on 550 acres of land in the 
Consejo Area about two miles north of Corozal Town. “The company plans to build 
vacation villas, condominiums, hotels along the seaside. The resort will have an 18 
hole golf course and a harbour marina for pleasure boats” (GOB, Oct. 1990,13). At 
the time Consejo already had the Adventure Inn Resort and was being promoted 
as a residential area for retired US and Canadian citizens. The resort eventually 
closed, but the residential area for retirees continues to grow slowly. The Consejo 
Bay Project was also aborted, and it is not quite clear if the extension of land 
proposed for development was sold to the company and what the future of it will 
be. 
 
Belize's environmental resources create substantial opportunities in the nature-
based tourism market; the district of Corozal can participate in it, but much has to 
be done in regards to training in services, tourist guides, catering, marketing, 
among others. Again government policies play an important role in promoting 
tourism in out districts; concentration of funds and activities and centralization of 
policies will not help Corozal to diversify its economy. 
 
A favourable initiative was the creation by government in 1990 of the Belize Tourist 
Board to carry out marketing plans. Their actions should focus on the districts too. 
 
Fiscal incentives to promote employment in Corozal. 
 
As mentioned above, Corozal suffered economically during the early years of 
independence; the devaluation of the Mexican peso and the closure of the sugar 
factory had adversely affected employment. However, for the 1980s period and 
early 1990s no data on the rate of unemployment in this district are available. . 
 
Unemployment Rate 
Corozal District 1993-2005
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As shown above, in 1999 the highest unemployment rate was experienced, but the 
entire period shows instability of employment. The fluctuations were primarily 
because of the opening of new sources, such as the Export Processing Zone and 
the Commercial Free Zone, which offset some of the decline caused by other 
economic activities. In a move to bring stability to employment in the country of 
Belize, the government created an array of fiscal incentives. 
 
The 1990 Fiscal Incentives Act provided tax holidays and duty exemptions for 
investments that would benefit the economy. The 1990 Income Tax Act granted tax 
relief to non-traditional exporters.  
Several incentive schemes have been instituted to encourage and promote 
investment. The investment schemes are contained in the following legislations: 
1. Fiscal Incentives Act No. 6 of 1990 
2. Mines and Minerals Act, 1988 
3. Export Processing Zone (EPZ) Act, 1990 
4. Commercial Free Zone (CFZ) Act, 1994 
5. International Business & Public Investment (IBC) Act, 1990 
The Export processing Zone in Corozal 
The Export- Processing Zones (EPZ) Act exempted eligible firms from certain 
requirements concerning import licenses, quotas, import and export taxes, export 
licenses, price controls, and other regulatory mechanisms. The first export-
processing zones (EPZs) were scheduled to be established in 1993. The concept 
required the designation or development of a physical facility (the zone) similar to 
an industrial park. As part of the effort to provide a more favorable environment for 
investment, Prime Minister George Cadle Price also introduced legislation that 
would lower corporate taxes from 45% to 35% in fiscal year 1992.  
 
The EPZ Act’s main focus was to encourage local and foreign investment in Belize 
in order to promote trade, foreign exchange earnings, employment, and transfer of 
technology. Belize’s first EPZ was inaugurated at San Andres, Corozal on July 
18th, 1992 (Belize Times, August 2,1992). A total of two companies established in 
Corozal under this fiscal incentive: Pleat-Tex Ltd and The Belize Bicycle Co. The 
EPZ is located in the Village of San Andres, two miles from Corozal Town. The 
expectation on the passing of the Act was for this EPZ to generate approximately 
2,500 jobs, a goal never attained. In 1994 the EPZ Programme was amended, but 
the number of established companies under this did not increase in Corozal. 
 
Transformation of the Northern Economy: The Commercial Free Zone in Corozal 
 
The Corozal Free Zone (CFZ) project was a private initiative involving few citizens5 
interested in the development of the northern region. In its proposal phase, the 
CFZ project was consulted with the Northern Caucus6 and the Corozal Business 
Community. Once the proposal was written, the supporters of the CFZ lobbied 
nationally to get the approval of the Cabinet.  
 
The Commercial Free Zone Act No 27 was passed in June of 1994 and was 
published in the Gazette on the 11th February, 1995. This was a much needed 
instrument to reverse the economic situation of Corozal. 
An Act to provide for the establishment and operation of 
commercial free zones within Belize to foster commercial trade and 
investment with neighboring countries, to promote economic growth 
and development, to create new employment opportunities for 
                                                 
5  I was personally involved in the initial proposal of the CFZ, and became the first Free Zone Business 
Association’s General Manager in 1996. 
6  A group consisting of  the Peoples United Party representatives and other interested citizens. 
Belizeans, and to provide for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto. (Act No 27 of 1994)  
As defined in the Act, a commercial free zone means a geographic area in Belize  
designated as such by  the Commercial Free Zone Management Agency (CFZMA), 
where  investors may establish businesses and conduct trade and commerce free 
of the national customs regime.  
 
One year later in June of 1995 the Corozal CFZ started to operate with the 
establishment of the CFZMA’s office at the Santa Elena Border, situated at the foot 
of the bridge connecting Mexico and Belize. Its purpose was to establish a private 
sector driven commercial activity with internationally competitive laws for the 
attraction of trade and investment in Belize. This designated area can best be 
described as a tax haven. Its primary income was to be the administrative services 
offered to the businesses. Its location offered an advantage since it is within 
walking distance from the only bridge that connects Mexico and Belize, allowing 
Mexican residents to enter the zone without having to go through Belize’s 
Immigration and Customs checkpoints.  
 
Its strategic location made it attractive for tourism packages and offshore financial 
services. The signing of the North American Free Trade Area gave it another 
competitive advantage; the slogan utilized to showcase it was “60 seconds to 
NAFTA territories.” The objective was for the CFZ to serve, in addition to the 
NAFTA territory, the wider Asian and European market. The expected goods 
traded were automobiles, chemical products, electric and electronic equipment, 
iron and steel, textiles and leather, oil, fresh vegetables, computers, machinery 
parts, glass, cattle, fresh fruits, copper, photographic appliances, mining products, 
wood, shrimp, coffee, petrochemicals, canned foods and other products. 
 
Although the performance of the Free Zone of Colon in Panama and in Miami, 
Florida served as models to design the CFZ of Belize, other experiences were 
welcomed to improve the operation of this pioneering project. Thus for the month of 
January 1996, experts from the Free Zone of Chile visited the CFZ of Belize to give 
their advice on its future development. They met with government authorities and 
other business officials in Belize and in Chetumal, Mexico. The specialists stated, 
“As a development alternative, this (CFZ) should be given priority in Government’s 
economic policy and must be keep on the agenda until it becomes consolidated” 
(Ken, 1996). 
 
The CFZ started with the businesses already established as “In bond” businesses 
and some new arrivals. The first businesses were Belizean based companies. Few 
Mexicans businesses took up the challenge. As months went by, promotions were 
directed to Belize, Mexico, and the US; new investments started to flow both from 
Mexico and Belize.  
 
The promotion of the Affiliated Associates, small scale businesses, brought in 
many small business people from Belize and Mexico. The full package for 
company formation, including as optional the purchase of land, was US$12,500, 
among other expenses. 
 
By the end of 1995, goods were already being imported to the CFZ; these included 
food items and cereals. Mexico at this time was going through economic 
restructuring since its entry in the GATT/WTO and the NAFTA agreement was 
eliminating its tariff advantages, and its privileged free zone territory was 
disappearing. The CFZ offered the Mexican businessmen an alternative to 
continue in the activity they knew well. This prompted their participation as 
businesses opened with very high expectations from the Mexican customers. By 
the end of 1996, and especially for its Christmas season, businesses at the CFZ 
made good sales. Mexican consumers were flooding the CFZ. It was precisely at 
this initial stage that the CFZ project gained the acceptance of the business 
community of both Mexico and Belize. From there on, the entry of businesses to 
the CFZ multiplied, attracting Mexican, Belizean, and other foreign investors (Ken, 
2000). 
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In the year 2000 there were a total of 372 registered companies, of which 215 were 
active. The type of economic activities at the time were manufacturing, consulting, 
importation and exportation, wholesale and retail, leases of business spaces, gas 
stations, restaurants, electric energy and construction. 
 
In 2000 the major businesses sold commodities such as liquors, perfumes, 
foodstuff, gift items, electronics and appliances, household items, footwear, 
clothing, beverage, health and beauty aids, tires, cigars and cigarettes. At that time 
fuel distribution to Mexican clients was a substantial part of the zone’s commercial 
activity. Also taking place were light industries such as the manufacturing of 
compact and optical disks, CD ROMs, plastic bottles; brooms, and mops. 
 
The transit of Mexican vehicles to the CFZ in 2000 increased 30% 
in the first six months compared to the same period in 1999, stated 
the Mexican Customs Administrator at Subteniente Lopez. This 
represented an amount of 642,096 automobiles, including some 
that came from as far as the states of Campeche, Yucatán, 
Chiapas, Veracruz, and Tabasco. He stated that from Monday to 
Friday, an average of 3,304 vehicles crossed the border per day to 
shop at the CFZ; on Saturdays and Sundays there was an increase 
to 3775 vehicles. He recorded approximately 1 million vehicles to 
have crossed the border towards the CFZ in 1999 with at least 3 
occupants that went shopping for  food items, clothing, shoes, 
gasoline and electric appliances. (Notimex, 31st July 2000).  
 
Taking into account the large amount of “walk over” customers, it was estimated that 
some 10 to 12 thousand Mexicans patrons entered the CFZ daily to shop in the 
growing number of establishments. 
 
Reduced prices for gasoline and commodities kept attracting Mexican consumers 
to the CFZ. In 2000 a total of 14,743,175 gallons of gasoline were imported to the 
CFZ, shared among five gas stations for a value of $44,084,893.62 Bz. This was 
approximately 28% of the total volume of commerce of the CFZ. 
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All this activity at the CFZ meant an increase in imports registered in Belize. The 
graph below shows gross total imports and the amount that corresponds to the 
CFZ from 2000 to 2005. Imports to the CFZ increased from 2000 to 2002 and fell 
slightly in 2003, and more so in 2004. Total imports also show a reduction in that 
same year. Part of the decline of the CFZ imports in 2004 may be the result of the 
opening in Chetumal of the first mall and a department store. These took away part 
of the CFZ market. From that date to the present, businesses at the CFZ have 
suffered reduced sales. The only attractiveness remaining is the casinos and a 
recently opened night club. 
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The year 2002 was a good year for the CFZ since it registered the largest amount 
of imports. The following years show a reduction of imports. The year 2004 also 
showed a reduction of total imports. “Gross imports (f.o.b.) contracted by Bz$83.2 
million, with respective decline of Bz$58.7 million and Bz$24.5 million for goods 
imported into the customs’ territory and the CFZ” (Central Bank of Belize, 2004). 
 
In 2004 re-exports declined by 10.7% to Bz$232.4 million, reflecting reductions in 
sales from the CFZ and the customs’ territory of 7.6% and 42.6% respectively. 
Cross-border sales at the CFZ fell as customs’ regulations at the northern border 
further tightened and fuel prices in the Mexican border town of Chetumal remained 
lower than that in the CFZ (Central Bank of Belize, 2004). 
 
The CFZ has impacted on the import structure of Belize. As shown below, we can 
see that importation to the CFZ is second in importance only after machinery and 
transport equipment. This infers important sales that should be vital in keeping 
employment and business activity. However, it is not known how much of these 
imports to the CFZ go back into the territory of Belize and how much to Mexico. 
These pieces of information are significant to measure the real impact of the CFZ 
in the border region. 
 
A social cost was introduced at the CFZ imports of 1.5% on the aggregate value of 
general merchandise and 10% on fuel. This social cost was to finance research 
and infrastructural wear and tear in the country, as a result of the roads used to 
transport goods from Belize to the CFZ. Since the implementation of the cost, 
nothing has been said of the use of these monies, nor of the total amount collected 
to date. Further studies into the economic impact of the CFZ are needed, for there 
are many aspects of it that are not yet known. 
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The CFZ  Performance 
The CFZ is a trap and is not a viable solution to economic development. 
Employment and increased incomes are needed, but dependency on one activity 
predominantly is dangerous. The delicate situation of the activities at the CFZ is 
exacerbated because of its border location. All borders are focal points where the 
concerned governments must have in place proper control on all types of trafficking 
for the benefit of the population at large. 
 
The objective of the CFZ was to compete with the Miami International Free Zone  
and the Colon Free Zone in Panama with regards to the amount of  imports and 
reexports. The retail business in the CFZ was important, but not to the extent of 
becoming the main activity7. This retail business  created  various problems for the 
CFZ: first, the amount spent by Mexican consumers was limited to US$50, which is 
                                                 
7  The retail business was implemented as a complementary activity (taken from the Chilean model) since the 
main activity at the Free Zones in the world are movement of great volumes of imports and reexports. 
the franchise for international border regions, according to the customs law of 
Mexico. Second, the migration situation required shopper to have the proper 
migration documents to leave the country. Most Mexicans did no possess such 
documents. Soon the Immigration Office in Chetumal had long queues of citizens 
filing to acquire a border pass, and this occurred to such an extent that the solution 
of exempting them from this requirement was soon reached. Third, an 
infrastructural problem resulted from the traffic jams at the international bridge. 
These were caused by the numerous busses and private Mexican cars from 
central and southern Mexican territories, and pedestrians going toward Belize  and 
the busses and the private vehicles, and pedestrians from Belize entering Mexico. 
Fourth, numerous security problems for vehicles and persons existed since many 
vehicles were damaged or hampered with and the insurance companies did not 
respond because the CFZ territory was considered in neither Mexico nor Belize. 
The CFZ was not prepared; eventually some of these problems were addressed 
with the implementation of security guards at the gates and the expansion of the 
CFZ territory allowing another gate to be opened.  
 
As part of the expansion of the CFZ, the migration and customs offices at the 
Santa Elena border have had to relocate. Plans are also on way to build another 
bridge over the Rio Hondo to provide for a more fluid vehicle pass. 
 
 Effects on employment, investment, and growth in general 
 
The CFZ has generated the much needed employment for inhabitants of the 
northern districts. Direct employment has been as shop keepers, attendants, and 
casino employees. Indirect employment occurs in companies and industries such 
as trucking, mechanics, retail stores, car rental agencies, insurance brokers, and 
construction material vendors. People work as contractors, masons, electricians, 
plumbers, engineers, architects, accountants, and landlords, among others.  
 
In 2000, there were a total of 1,709 direct employees at the CFZ of which 307 are 
foreigners who are primarily administrative and technical personnel. 
 
As stated above, more detailed studies need to be conducted to analyse the 
impact on direct and indirect employment, its effects on the growth and 
development of the border region, the growth of the CFZ businesses, its 
competitiveness and its prospective. Some claims of low paying jobs and labour 
exploitation have been made by CFZ employees. These allegations were made 
public on some of the national radio stations. Some would argue that a badly paid 
job is better than none, but there are laws and regulations in Belize and at the CFZ, 
although the latter does not provide duration of work per day and wage level. 
 
Improved income is evident in Corozal since new shops and hotels are flourishing. 
There is a certain degree of improvement in incomes demonstrated by the 
economic activity; however, there is still much needed to recover the economic 
activity of the 70s. 
 
The way forward 
 
The District of Corozal is part of a broader territory; therefore, its economic 
performance is largely dependent on the national economic policies and programs. 
As we have seen, Corozal has gone from a buoyant economy when sugar cane 
cultivation was booming, to a state of depression due to the loss of jobs as a result 
of the closure of the sugar factory. There is a slight recovery, basically due to the 
operation of the CFZ.  There are, however, other activities that need to bring the 
desired diversification to the economy; agriculture products with viable markets, 
papaya is on the way; tourism, which needs proper attention, the refocusing of the 
CFZ to compete in volume and value with the major free zones of the hemisphere, 
and most importantly of adequate government policies. Poverty has become   a 
daily debate among the sufferers and the policy makers. The perception that the 
Belizean society is divided among the poor and the wealthy is accurate. This socio-
economic stratification existed previously, but the gap was not as wide during the 
pre-independent period, at least not among native Belizeans. Although Corozal is 
not on the lower end, it does reflect the need for the national government to take 
the out districts into serious consideration in their planning process8.  
 
 
 
 
 Calculation of Gini and the Lorenz Curve for the District of  Corozal 
  
                 Gini  =  0,640086049                                         Gini   =   0,580970874 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
 
                                                 
8  This paper did not take into consideration social topics such as drugs, education, housing, 
medical care among others, but they all play an important role in the economic performance of 
every region. 
 
The Lorenz curve and the Gini index are measures of income distribution.  The 
Lorenz curve gives an indication of income distribution inequality with respect to a 
perfect distribution (45 degree) curve. 
 
The Gini index measures the level of income concentration; the index varies 
between 0 (equal distribution) and 1 (greater concentration). The graph above 
indicates that for the year 2000, there is less concentration, although for both 
years, 1991 and 2000, the indices are very high, indicating a stronger tendency 
towards concentration. Further studies should be done to determine if the impact of 
the CFZ might have caused the Gini index to show a better position for 2000. 
 
Given the above analysis, I think that the prosperity and “answer to our prayers” 
that the CFZ was supposed to be is an illusion 
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